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Weekly sales at retail stores exhibit several patterns 
that the existing literature on price promotion does 
not fully capture. In this paper we develop a simple 
symmetric model where duopoly manufacturers 
distribute competing brands through a monopoly 
retailer to serve consumers with heterogeneous 
reservation prices. We show that the heterogeneity in 
consumers’ reservation prices coupled with the 
retailer’s market power is sufficient to resolve the 
deficiency in the literature. We then show that, while 
pricing patterns under this model differ significantly 
from those under a model where the retailer has no 
market power, the manufacturers’ expected profits 
are the same in both cases. 
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Introduction 
Price promotion at both the wholesale and retail 
levels is a ubiquitous phenomenon. As Raju et al. 
(1990) comment, short-term discounts are one of the 
major competitive weapons in the brand manager’s 
arsenal. Blattberg et al. (1995) also note that 
nondurable goods manufacturers spend more money 
on promotion than on advertising. The most 
frequently seen price promotions are probably the 
weekly markdowns at grocery stores1. Table 1 below 
presents a series of such promotions2.  
Table 1 illustrates several prominent and 
interesting patterns. First, competing brands of the 
same product are featured in different promotional 
periods3. That is, in a given week, at most one of the 
competing brands is featured. For example, Perdue 
chicken breast was advertised on sale during the 
week of March 25. Then, during the week of April 1, 
Tyson chicken breast replaced Perdue’s in the flyer. 
                                                 
1 Promotions at the wholesale level are called trade 
deals or trade promotions, and promotions at the 
retail level are called retail promotions. Among 
various forms of sales promotions, we concentrate 
solely on price cuts in this paper. 
2 The data is obtained from weekly sales flyers at the 
Kroger stores in Bloomington, IN. The promotional 
prices listed in the flyers were typically valid for one 
week. 
3 This phenomenon is also noted by Lal (1990), who 
attributes it to collusion between national brands. 
Second, the promotional prices for the same product 
are similar both across competing brands and across 
different sales periods, even when the regular prices 
are different. For instance, Brawny and Scott paper 
towels had about a $2 difference in their regular 
prices, but their sales prices were both $4.99/pack. 
Third, the promotional prices represent relatively 
large discounts from the corresponding regular prices. 
In our sample above, we see price cuts of 30%-50% 
of the regular prices. Fourth, each of the brands was 
sold at the regular price more than half of the times. 
    These patterns naturally invite a search for 
theoretical explanations. In line with the importance 
of price promotion, there has been substantial 
research to rationalize price promotion. Varian (1980) 
shows that stores may use price promotion to exploit 
information heterogeneity among consumers. Baye 
and Morgan (2001) further the analysis by studying 
the impact of a market for price information on retail 
pricing strategies on the homogeneous product 
market it serves. Along a similar line, Narasimhan 
(1988) analyzes differences in consumers’ brand 
loyalty and shows that firms employ mixed pricing 
strategy to attract brand switchers. Agrawal (1996), 
Lal and Villas-Boas (1998), Raju et al. (1990), Rao 
(1991) and Simester (1997) strengthen this argument 
of brand loyalty and extend it to more general 
settings. Conlisk et al. (1984), Sobel (1984), and 
Pesendorfer (2002), on another hand, examine price 
promotion in intertemporal settings and relate it to 
intertemporal price discrimination and intertemporal 
demand effects.  
  While these existing studies cast tremendous 
insights on understanding frms’ price promotion 
decisions, they cannot satisfactorily account for the 
patterns revealed in Table 1. In particular, models 
with common reservation price, such as Varian 
(1980), Lal and Villas-Boas (1996, 1998), and Baye 
and Morgan (2001), predict that everything is on sale 
everyday, yet the depth of sale can be any amount of 
a random draw from the equilibrium price 
distribution. Such predictions contradict some of the 
main characteristics of weekly sales at Kroger; 
namely, the alternating featuring of different brands 
in different weeks, use of the same sales price for 
competing brands, and deep discounts from the 
regular prices. In addition, in the Kroger flyers we 
observe that both of the competing brands have 
positive probabilities to be priced at their regular and 
promotional prices, whereas models with asymmetry 
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in brand loyalty, such as Narasimhan (1988) and 
Raju et al.(1990), prescribe that only the stronger 
brand has a positive probability of being sold at the 
regular price. Moreover, many studies in the 
literature, including Varian (1980), Sobel (1984), 
Narasimhan (1988), Lal (1990), Raju et al. (1990), 
and Baye and De Vries (1992), abstract away from 
the channel setting. But as shown by Lal and 
Villas-Boas (1996, 1998) and Baye and Morgan 
(2001), strategic interaction between channel 




Table 1. Price Promotions Observed in Kroger Weekly Flyers        
 
  In this paper, we employ a parsimonious model to 
reconcile the above inconsistency between the 
observed sales patterns and theory, and to also 
analyze how market structure affects promotional 
decisions. In our symmetric model 4 , duopoly 
manufacturers distribute close substitutes through a 
common monopoly retailer to serve consumers with 
heterogeneous reservation prices. We show that the 
heterogeneity in consumers’ reservation prices 
(reservation price differential hereinafter) coupled 
with the retailer’s market power is sufficient to drive 
all the promotional patterns revealed in Table 1. We 
show that the retailer employs pure-strategy Hi-Lo 
pricing to exploit the reservation price differential, 
and it only does so when the size of the low valuation 
segment is large enough. The competing 
manufacturers, on the other hand, use mixed 
strategies in wholesale price cuts to compete for the 
chances of serving low valuation consumers. 
  We also highlight the effects of channel structure 
on sales patterns and welfare. A powerful retailer in 
the channel is able to set stickier retail prices that are 
not linear functions of the wholesale prices. Thus the 
Hi-Lo retail pricing will not break down even when 
the wholesale prices are only one penny apart5. On 
                                                 
4 The symmetry in our model enables us to obtain 
more general results that do not rely on any 
asymmetry in the competing manufacturers’ market 
shares, consumers’ brand loyalty level, or relative 
sizes of different consumer segments between 
competing brands. 
5 This finding differs from the results in Agrawal’s 
(1996) study, where the Hi-Lo price equilibrium can 
break down when the two manufacturers price 
closely enough to each other. 
the other hand, if the retailer has no power in the 
channel, pricing patterns at both the retail and 
wholesale levels change significantly. There are 
more price promotions and deeper discounts to 
benefit the consumers, but the manufacturers’ 
expected profits remain the same. 
  Our model integrates the extant models of price 
promotion with added features, which allows us to 
obtain better data fitting equilibrium pricing patterns 
than those predicted by the existing studies. For 
example, our base model can be thought as 
Narasimhan’s (1988) model with an added monopoly 
retailer and with reservation price differential 
between loyal consumers and brand switchers. Our 
direct selling model can be thought as a general 
version of Varian.s (1980) and the no-loyalty case of 
Lal and Villas-Boas’s (1998) models that allow 
reservation price differential6. While none of these 
three models predicts a fixed promotional and/or 
regular price as seen in the Kroger flyers, our model 
does. 
    The rest of the paper is arranged as follows. In 
Section 2, we first analyze the base model with a 
powerful retailer, then deprive the retailer of channel 
power and solve for the resulted equilibrium, and in 
the end compare the price promotion patterns from 
these two models. Section 3 concludes.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
                                                 
6 There are some other extreme cases in Lal and 
Villas-Boas’s (1998) study, as pointed out by one 
reviewer. Most of those cases deal with size  
asymmetry in consumer segments for different 
manufacturers and retailers. 
Product Boneless Skinless Chicken Breast 
Orange Juice 
(64oz Carton) 8 Roll Paper Towel 
Brand Perdue Tyson Minute Maid Tropicana Brawny Scott 
Regular Price $4.99/lb $4.99/lb $3.75/carton $3.89/carton $9.45/pack $7.29/pack 
03/25/2004 $1.99/lb Not featured Not featured Not featured Not featured $4.99/pack 
04/01/2004 Not featured $1.99/lb $1.99/carton Not featured $4.99/pack Not featured
04/08/2004 Not featured $1.99/lb Not featured $1.99/carton $4.99/pack Not featured
04/15/2004 Not featured Not featured Not featured Not featured Not featured $4.99/pack 
04/22/2004 $1.99/lb Not featured $1.99/carton Not featured Not featured Not featured
04/29/2004 Not featured Not featured Not featured Not featured Not featured Not featured
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    In this paper we examine the incentives for price 
promotion from a different perspective: the 
segmentation of consumer market based on 
reservation price. The results derived from our model 
do not depend on brand loyalty and can be applied to 
both the cases of repeatedly purchased products and 
those of durable goods. The predictions of our model 
are consistent with the price promotion patterns 
observed at retail stores. We have also shown that (1) 
heterogeneity in consumers’ reservation prices is an 
important determinant of competitive price 
promotion strategies, (2) differences in market 
structure can result in significant differences in the 
pricing patterns at both the retail and wholesale 
levels, but (3) because of competition in the retail 
market, changes in market structure do not 
necessarily alter wholesale profitability.  
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